Track 2 Diplomacy
From Track 1 to Track 2
Most of the time negotiations are based on a formal mandate and are carried out from one government to another. However there is also track 2 diplomacy: informal and between experts with good access to government. You have track 1.5 dialogues in-between→ officials and experts that talk to each other. This last track is only possible in less polarised settings, not easy nowadays.
It’s the behind-the-scenes of diplomacy, part of a continuum of tracks.
Why does Track 2 matter?
Lower political cost
They can be ignored, governments can pretend they didn’t know about them if they don’t succeed. Granted a government could decide to make them public while the other doesn’t but this would kill the process and why even engage in such talks then? There wouldn’t be many good motives for this… close to none.
Sustaining communication
Even in crisis!
Clarifying misperceptions
There are instances where track 1 can’t clarify things without escalation (being interpreted as propaganda, disrespect, etc…) or political cost. Informal and more casual discussions are needed to show empathy and reassure each other.
Building trust
Repeated dialogue (diffuse reciprocity basically) and CBM (saying we’ll notify you before military exercises) build trust.
Generating options
Sometimes negotiating (e.g. for a peace agreement) is only possible in informal and confidential channels so as to not show weakness, recognition, etc… among other possibilities.
GCSP’s dialogue activities
50% funded by CH and other half by private entities, has created most of its tracks (as in individual dialogue initiative) in the last few years. It’s difficult to maintain impartiality and make every stakeholder happy. In Geneva it’s easier to be international and distanced from a permanent Swiss identity.
Global south competitors are still not at gcsps level of expertise.
Objectives
- Maintaining / establishing communication channels.
- Stays open even if T.1 has been frozen because of a crisis.
- Preventing misunderstandings.
- Clarifying without fear of political backlash and exploring reactions to possible compromises.
- Exploring CBMs and settlement related issues.
- E.g. ceasefires and possible solution to disputes.
- Discussing false narratives.
- E.g. defeating Russia by weakening it in the following years.
- Identifying shared interests.
- E.g. USA and RSS discussing Syria and identifying a list of shared interests.
Our method
- Impartial facilitation in a safe environment.
- Moving away from cities such as Geneva, as they are big agglomerations.
- Continuity / Confidentiality.
- They don’t want solutions from the GCSP’s but to be given bridges and communication opportunities. In other tracks this might change but not here.
- Bridging policy and expert communities.
- Connecting track 2 to 1. This is perfect for Geneva, it is possible to talk to officials after talking with between experts.
Underlying
- Track 2 is normally not a replacement for Track 1 It should support and complement Track 1. The result of the discussions, as substantive as they may be, have to be conveyed to relevant capitals.
Dialogue portfolio
Geopolitics and arms control
Bringing China/US/RSS together, often bilaterally.
- China/US nuclear non-proliferation.
- Space Security Dialogue.
- Proliferation of military activity in space.
- United States/Russia Dialogue in a Multipolar World.
- United States/Russia Dialogue on Syria.
- US/Russia strategic stability (nuclear arms).
- Suspended.
- P-5 Expert dialogue AI/CL3.
- The High North Talks (Arctic).
- Arctic Council now dysfunctional (countries don’t wanna talk with Russia).
- “Small Bridges” USA/China (on the Middle East).
European security
CH chairs OSCE conferences to generate and get the first possibly unfiltered ideas to solve an issue.
Regional focus
Ukraine-Russia
Trying to achieve ceasefire modalities (state of the art innovations). Before the war they wanted to setup Track 2 negotiation separated from T.1, and even now this intention remains even though everything is suspended.
A glimpse on Track 1 Diplomacy
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine (21 March 2014)
Tensions were rising as everyone wondered in which direction Ukraine would move in 2013 (EU/RSS). Ukraine was getting closer to the west after the change of government and RSS took Crimea and blocked OSCE observers from coming in.
A negotiation then ensued in the OSCE, but the Russians weren’t part of the negotiations at first. They convinced RSS that negotiation was good for russian speaking minorities in Ukraine. But after Crimea was occupied there were territorial disagreements so the mandate wasn’t being given. In the end Merkel convinced Ukraine that it was in their interest to give up territorial integrity and disagreements to stop escalation and the SMM was in their interest. The RSSs brought in two killer clauses from the high ranking part of the Kremlin and Merkel had to call Putin so that he let go of these clauses. Finally consensus was reached, Ukrainians were convinced there was no trap.
The solution to geographical disagreements was ambiguities to make each side believe they held Crimea as to the language of the text.
The Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) aimed to contribute, throughout the country and in co-operation with the concerned OSCE executive structures and relevant actors of the international community (such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security; and to monitoring and supporting the implementation of all OSCE principles and commitments.
This is an example of the difficulties and process of negotiation between officials→ Track 1 diplomacy.
Negotiations Minsk / Istanbul March / April 2022
Low-level delegations but with great links to their respective presidents, after the escalation between RSS and Ukraine (no one had incentives not to escalate). When RSS realised the difficulty, they tried to reach for ceasefire negotiations:
- Istanbul Communiqué, 29.03.2022.
- Draft treaties (Ukrainian / Russian 15.04.2022).
- Issues dealt with:
- Ukraine’s neutrality.
- Security guarantees.
- Territorial issues.
- Crimea (frozen for 15 years).
- Military capabilities.
- Minority protection. Higher level negotiations were delegated some important issues even. But negotiations eventually stalled. RSSs say that it was the visit of Boris Johnson that convinced Zelenskyy to stop negotiating, in reality the military momentum shifted and Ukraine realised they’d get more fighting than negotiating. Even then, the issues dealt with should be inspirational for any future negotiation.
The way forward according to expert advice (UKR-RSS war)
Despite USA efforts formal negotiations have not resumed. Two types of negotiations would have to be carried out simultaneously, to at least get to an agreement in principles:
Ceasefire modalities
- Verification.
- Incident management.
- Communication channels.
Framework agreement on principles of settlement
- Security guarantees.
- Territorial issues.
- Sanctions and reparations.
- Minority protection.
Accountability would have to be postponed, wouldn’t be possible right now. There is hope for negotiation however, thanks to Trump after Gaza.
Take-aways
